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Abstract
We consider the problem of reliably broadcasting information in a multihop asynchronous
network in the presence of Byzantine failures: some nodes may exhibit unpredictable malicious
behavior. We focus on completely decentralized solutions. Few Byzantine-robust algorithms
exist for loosely connected networks. A recent solution guarantees reliable broadcast on a torus
when D > 4, D being the minimal distance between two Byzantine nodes.
In this paper, we generalize this result to 4-connected planar graphs. We show that reliable
broadcast can be guaranteed when D > Z, Z being the maximal number of edges per polygon.
We also show that this bound on D is a lower bound for this class of graphs. Our solution has
the same time complexity as a simple broadcast. This is also the first solution where the memory
required increases linearly (instead of exponentially) with the size of transmitted information.
Important disclaimer These results have NOT yet been published in an international confer-
ence or journal. This is just a technical report presenting intermediary and incomplete results. A
generalized version of these results may be under submission.
1 Introduction
As modern networks grow larger, they become more likely to fail, as nodes may be subject to
crashes, attacks, transient bit flips, etc. To encompass all possible cases, we consider the most
general model of failure: the Byzantine model [11], where the failing nodes can exhibit arbitrary
malicious behavior. In other words, tolerating Byzantine nodes implies guaranteeing they are not
able to cause problems in the correct part of the network.
In this paper, we study the problem of reliably broadcasting information in a multihop network.
In the ideal case, the source node sends the information to its neighbors, that in turn send it to
their own neighbors, and so forth (this is denoted in the sequel as a “simple broadcast”). However,
a single Byzantine node can forward a false information and lie to the entire network. Our goal is
to design a solution that guarantees reliable broadcast in the presence of Byzantine retransmitters.
Related works. Many Byzantine-robust protocols are based on cryptography [3, 5]: the nodes
use digital signatures to authenticate the sender across multiple hops. However, as the malicious
nodes are supposed to ignore some cryptographic secrets, their behavior cannot be considered as
entirely arbitrary. Besides, manipulating asymmetric cryptography requires important resources,
which may not always be available. The most important point is that cryptography requires some
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degree of trusted infrastructure to initially distributes public and private keys: therefore, if this
initial infrastructure fails, the whole network fails. Yet, we want to design a totally decentralized
solution, where any element can fail independently without compromising the whole system. For
these reasons, we focus on non-cryptographic solutions.
Cryptography-free solutions have first been studied in completely connected networks [11, 1, 12, 13,
19]: a node can directly communicate with any other node, which implies the presence of a channel
between each pair of nodes. Therefore, these approaches are hardly scalable, as the number of
channels per node can be physically limited. We thus study solutions in multihop networks, where
a node must rely on other nodes to broadcast informations.
A notable class of algorithms tolerates Byzantine failures with either space [15, 20, 23] or time [14,
9, 8, 7, 6] locality. Space local algorithms try to contain the fault as close to its source as possible.
This is only applicable to the problems where the information from distant nodes is unimportant:
vertex coloring, link coloring, dining philosophers, etc. Also, time local algorithms presented so far
can hold at most one Byzantine node, and are not able to mask the effect of Byzantine actions.
Thus, this approach is not applicable to reliable broadcast.
In [4], it was shown that, for agreement in the presence of up to k Byzantine nodes, it is necessary
and sufficient that the network is (2k + 1)-connected, and that the number of nodes in the system
is at least 3k + 1. However, this solution assumes that the topology is known to every node, and
that the network is synchronous. Both requirements have been relaxed in [21]: the topology is
unknown and the scheduling is asynchronous. Yet, this solution retains 2k + 1 connectivity for
reliable broadcast and k + 1 connectivity for failure detection.
Another existing approach is based on the fraction of Byzantine neighbors per node. Solutions
have been proposed for nodes organized on a lattice [10, 2]. Reliable broadcast was shown possible
if every node has strictly less than a 1/4 fraction of Byzantine neighbors. This result was later
generalized to other topologies [22], assuming that each node knows the global topology.
All aforementioned approaches are hardly applicable to loosely connected networks, where each
node has a limited (possibly upper bounded by a constant) number of neighbors. For instance,
on a torus topology (see Figure 1), no existing solution can tolerate more than one Byzantine
node. Efficient solutions have been proposed for such networks [16, 18], but only give probabilistic
guarantees, and require the nodes to know their position in the network. This last requirement
was relaxed in [17]: reliable broadcast is guaranteed on a torus when D > 4, D being the minimal
number of hops between two Byzantine nodes.
Figure 1: Torus (left) and 4-connected planar graph (right)
Our contribution. In this paper, we generalize the result of [17] to 4-connected planar graphs
(see Figure 1). We show that reliable broadcast can be guaranteed when D > Z, Z being the
maximal number of edges per polygon. We also show that this bound is tight: if we only have
D ≥ Z, no algorithm can guarantee reliable broadcast for this class of graphs.
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Then, if we assume that the delay between two activations of a same process is bounded, we show
that reliable broadcast can be achieved in O(d) time units, d being the network diameter. So,
tolerating Byzantine failures yields the same time complexity as a simple broadcast.
Finally, we show that, unlike previous solutions [10, 2, 22, 16, 18, 17], the local memory required for
broadcasting is O(M) (instead of O(2M )), M being the maximal size of an information message.
Organization of the paper In Section 2, we present the hypotheses and describe the broadcast
protocol. In Section 3, we prove the condition for reliable broadcast, and show its tightness. In
Section 4, we establish the time complexity. Finally, in Section 5, we discuss about the memory
requirements.
2 Setting
In this section, we present our hypotheses and describe the broadcast protocol.
2.1 Hypotheses
Topology Let G = (G,E) be a graph representing the topology of the network. G denotes the
nodes, and E denotes the edges connecting two nodes. The graph G is planar : there exists a
bi-dimensional representation of this graph where edges do not cross. Besides, we assume that the
graph is 4-connected: to disconnect the graph, at least 4 nodes must be removed (see Definition 2).
From this hypothesis, each node connects at least 4 edges.
As the graph is planar, the edges delimit polygons (see Figure 1 and Definition 3). Let Z ≥ 3 be
the maximal number of edges per polygon, and let Y ≥ 4 be the maximal number of edges per
node. Z is a parameter of the algorithm.
Network Two nodes (or processes) connected by an edge (or channel) are called neighbors. A
node can only send messages to its neighbors. Some nodes are correct and follow the protocol
described thereafter. The other nodes are Byzantine, and have a totally unpredictable behavior.
The correct nodes do not know which nodes are Byzantine.
We consider an asynchronous network: any message sent is eventually received, but it can be at any
time. We assume that, in an infinite execution, any process is activated infinitely often; however, we
make no hypothesis on the order of activation of the processes. Finally, we assume authenticated
channels (or “oral” model): each node has a unique identifier, and knows the identifier of its
neighbors. Therefore, when a node receives a message from a neighbor p, it knows that p is the
actual author of the message.
2.2 Protocol
Preliminaries An arbitrary correct node, called the source, wants to broadcast an information
m0 in the network. We say that a correct node multicasts a message when it sends it to all its
neighbors, and delivers m when it permanently considers that m was broadcast by the source. We
say that we achieve reliable broadcast if all correct nodes eventually deliver m0.
Principle of the protocol We use the same underlying principle as in [17]: to actually deliver
an information message, a node must receive it from a direct neighbor q, but also (indirectly) from
another node located at at most Z − 2 hops. The intuitive idea is that, if two Byzantine nodes are
distant from more than Z hops, they can never cooperate to make a correct node deliver a false
information.
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Besides generalizing the aforementioned protocol to planar graphs, our new protocol improves
memory efficiency. Indeed, instead of storing all received messages in a set Rec, a correct node
uses a variable Rec(q) for each neighbor q, storing only the last message received from q. This
modification enables to reduce the memory required by the nodes (see Section 5).
The messages exchanged in the protocol are tuples of the form (m,S), where m is the information
broadcast by the source (or pretending to be it), and S is a set containing the identifiers of the
nodes already visited by the message.
Description of the protocol
• The source multicasts an arbitrary information m0.
• The correct nodes that are neighbors of the source wait until they receive an information m
from the source, then deliver m and multicast (m, ø).
• The other correct nodes have the following behavior:
– When (m,S) is received from a neighbor q, with q /∈ S and card(S) ≤ Z − 3: assign the
value (m,S) to Rec(q) and multicast (m,S ∪ {q}).
– When there exists m, p, q and S such that q 6= p, q /∈ S, Rec(q) = (m, ø) and Rec(p) =
(m,S): deliver m, multicast (m, ø) and stop.
3 Condition for reliable broadcast
In this section, we prove the main result of the paper: if D > Z, we achieve reliable broadcast.
We also show that this bound on D is tight: if we only have D ≥ Z, no algorithm can guarantee
reliable broadcast on this class of graphs.
3.1 Definitions
Definition 1 (Path and circular path). A path is a sequence of nodes (u1, . . . , un) such that ui
and ui+1 are neighbors. This path is circular if u1 and un are also neighbors. Unless we mention
it, we do not require that these nodes are distinct.
Definition 2 (Node-cut and k-connected network). As set S of nodes is a node-cut if the graph
G− S is disconnected, that is: there exists a pair of nodes {p, q} /∈ S such that no path connects p
and q in G− S. The network is k-connected if no node-cut contains less than k nodes.
Definition 3 (Polygon). A polygon is a circular path that does not surround any node in the
bidimensionnal representation of the planar graph.
Definition 4 (Neighbor and adjacent polygons). Two polygons are neighbors if they share at least
one node, and adjacent if they share an edge.
Definition 5 (Polygonal path). A polygonal path is a sequence of polygons (P1, . . . , Pn) such that
Pi and Pi+1 are adjacent.
Definition 6 (Connected polygons). A set S of polygons is connected if, for each pair of polygons
(P,Q) of S, there exists a polygonal path (P, P1, . . . , Pn, Q) in S.
Definition 7 (Correct and Byzantine polygons). A polygon is correct if all its nodes are correct.
Otherwise, it is Byzantine.
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3.2 Main theorem
Let us show that, if D > Z, we achieve reliable broadcast (Theorem 1).
Lemma 1. Let us suppose that D > Z. Then, if two polygons are neighbors, the set of their nodes
contains at most one Byzantine node.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Let us suppose the opposite: there exist two neighbor poly-
gons P and Q, and the set of their nodes contains two distinct Byzantine nodes b1 and b2.
As P and Q are neighbors, let u be a node shared by P and Q. Let (u, p1, . . . , pn) be a circular
path on P , and let (u, q1, . . . , qm) be a circular path on Q. Therefore, (u, p1, . . . , pn, u, q1, . . . , qm)
is a circular path containing all the nodes of P and Q.
As this circular path contains at most 2Z hops, two nodes of this path are distant of at most Z
hops. In particular, b1 and b2 are distant of at most Z hops, which contradicts D > Z. Hence, the
result.
Lemma 2. Let v be a node, and let V be the set of polygons containing v. Then, v is the only node
common to these polygons.
Proof. Let us suppose the opposite: the exists a node w 6= v common to these polygons. Let P be
a polygon containing v. Let q1 and q2 be the two neighbors of v contained by P . Let Q1 (resp. Q2)
be the polygon adjacent to P containing v and q1 (resp. q2). Let S be the set of nodes contained
by P . As a polygon contains at least 3 nodes, S − {v, w} contains at least one node. Then, as w
is also common to P , Q1 and Q2, {v, w} is a node-cut isolating S − {v, w} from the rest of the
network. This is impossible, as the network is 4-connected. Hence, the result.
Lemma 3. If D > Z, each correct node belongs to at least one correct polygon.
Proof. Let us suppose the opposite: there exists a correct node v that does not belong to any
correct polygon. Let V be the set of polygons containing v. Let P1 and P2 be two polygons of
V . As P1 and P2 are Byzantine, according to Lemma 1, they share the same Byzantine node b
Therefore, by induction, all the polygons of V share the same Byzantine node b. But according to
Lemma 2, v is the only node shared by the polygons of V . Therefore, b = v, and v is Byzantine:
contradiction. Hence, the result.
Lemma 4. Let v be a node, and let V be the set of polygons containing v. Let X be the set of
nodes contained by the polygons of V . Then, there exists a circular path (q1, . . . , qm) such that
nodes {q1, . . . , qm} are distinct and that contains all nodes of X − {v}, and only contains nodes of
X.
Proof. Let (e1, . . . , en) be the edges connected to v, ordered clockwise, and let en+1 = e1. Let ui
be the node connected to v by ei. If, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there exists a polygon containing the edges
ei and ei+1, go to paragraph 1. Else, go to paragraph 2.
1. Let Pi be the polygon containing the edges ei and ei+1. Let (v, ui, p
i
1, p
i
2, . . . , ui+1) be a
circular path on Pi, ordered clockwise. We define a path (u1, p
1
1, p
1
2, . . . , u2, p
2
1, p
2
2, . . . , un+1) =
(q1, . . . , qm+1), containing all the nodes of X − {v}. Let us show that the nodes {q1, . . . , qm}
are distinct. Let us suppose the opposite: there exists k and k′ > k such that uk = uk′ . Then,
{uk, v} is a node-cut disconnecting {uk+1, . . . , uk′−1} from the rest of the network, which is
impossible as the network is 4-connected. Thus, the nodes are distinct. Hence, the result.
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2. Let k be the first integer such that ek and ek+1 do not belong to any polygon. Let us notice
that there is no other integer k′ > k satisfying this property – otherwise, {v} would be a
node-cut isolating uk from uk′ . Then, let (e
′
1, . . . , e
′
n) be the edges connected to v, clockwise,
such that e′1 = ek+1.
Let Pi be the polygon containing the edges e
′
i and e
′
i+1. Let (v, ui, p
i
1, p
i
2, . . . , ui+1) be a
circular path on Pi, ordered clockwise. We define a path (u1, p
1
1, p
1
2, . . . , u2, p
2
1, p
2
2, . . . , un) =
(q1, . . . , qm−1), containing all nodes of X − {v}. For the same reasons as in paragraph 1, the
nodes {q1, . . . , qm−1} are distinct. Hence, the result, if we take qm = v.
Lemma 5. Let v be a node, and let V be the set of polygons containing v. Let S be the set of
polygons that are not is V , but are neighbors with a polygon of V . Then, S is connected.
Proof. Let (q1, . . . , qm) be the circular path of Lemma 4. Then, S = S1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sm, where Si is the
set of polygons containing qi. If each set Si is connected, as Si and Si+1 share a polygon containing
qi and qi+1, S is connected. Now, let us suppose that there exists a k such that Sk is not connected.
Sk contains only two disconnected parts, otherwise {v} would be a node-cut. Let (q′1, . . . , q′m) be
a circular path containing nodes {q1, . . . , qm}, ordered clockwise, such that q′1 = qk. Let S′1 (resp.
S′m+1) be the part of Sk containing the node q2 (resp. qm). ∀i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, let S′i be the set of
polygons containing q′i. Then, S = S1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sm = S′1 ∪ · · · ∪ S′m+1. Let us prove the following
property Pi by induction, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m + 1}: S′1 ∪ · · · ∪ S′i is connected.
• P1 is true, as S′1 is connected.
• Let us suppose that Pi is true, for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Let us suppose that S′1 ∪ · · · ∪ S′i+1 is not
connected. It implies that S′i+1 is not connected. S
′
i+1 contains only two disconnected parts,
otherwise {q′i+1} would be a node-cut. Let S′Ai+1 be the part containing the node q′i, and let
S′Bi+1 be the other part. Then, {q′1, v, q′i+1} is a node-cut isolating S′1 ∪ . . . S′i ∪S′Ai+1 from S′Bi+1,
which is impossible as the network is 4-connected. Thus, Pi+1 is true.
Therefore, Pm+1 is true, and S is connected.
Lemma 6. Let us suppose that D > Z. Let (P, P1, . . . , Pn, Q) be a polygonal path such that P and Q
are correct, and {P1, . . . , Pn} are Byzantine. Then, there exists a polygonal path (P,Q1, . . . , Qm, Q)
such that {Q1, . . . , Qm} are correct.
Proof. According to Lemma 1, Pi and Pi+1 share the same Byzantine node b. Therefore, by
induction, the polygons {P1, . . . , Pn} share the same Byzantine node b.
Let V be the set of polygons containing b, and let S be the set of polygons that are not in V , but
are neighbors to a polygon of V . As V contains P1 and Pn, by definition, S contains P and Q.
According to Lemma 5, S is connected: there exists a polygonal path (P,Q1, . . . , Qm, Q) in S. To
complete the proof, let us show that the polygons of S are correct.
Let us suppose the opposite: there exists a polygon P ′ of S that is Byzantine. Let b′ be the
Byzantine node contained by P ′. Then, as P ′ has a neighbor polygon in V , according to Lemma 1,
b′ = b. It implies that P ′ belongs to V : contradiction. Thus, the polygons of S are correct. Hence,
the result.
Lemma 7. If D > Z, the set of correct polygons is connected.
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Proof. Let P and Q be two correct polygons, and let (P, P1, . . . , Pn, Q) be a polygonal path. If
{P1, . . . , Pn} are correct, the result is trivial. Otherwise, let us consider the following process.
Let N be the smallest integer such that PN is Byzantine, and let M be the smallest integer greater
than N such that PM+1 is correct. Then, according to Lemma 6, there exists a polygonal path
(PN−1, Q1, . . . , Qm, PM+1) such that the polygons {Q1, . . . , Qm} are correct. Therefore, we can
replace the sequence (PN , . . . , PM ) by (Q1, . . . , Qm). We repeat this process until all the polygons
of the path are correct.
Lemma 8. Let us suppose that D ≥ Z. Then, if a correct node delivers an information, it is
necessarily m0.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Let us suppose the opposite: D ≥ Z, yet at least one correct
node delivers m′ 6= m0. Let u be the first correct node to deliver m′. It implies that there exists p,
q and S such that q 6= p, q /∈ S, Rec(q) = (m′, ø) and Rec(p) = (m′, S).
Rec(q) = (m′, ø) implies that u received (m′, ø) from a neighbor q. Let us suppose that q is correct.
Then, as q sent (m′, ø), it implies that q delivered m′. This is impossible, as u is the first correct node
to deliver m′. So q is necessarily Byzantine. Besides, according to the protocol, Rec(p) = (m′, S)
implies that card(S) ≤ Z − 3.
Let us prove the following property Pi by induction, for 0 ≤ i ≤ card(S): a correct node pi, located
at i + 2 hops or less from q, sent (m′, Si) with card(Si) = card(S)− i.
• First, let us show that P0 is true. Rec(p) = (m′, S) implies that p sent (m′, S). Let us suppose
that p is Byzantine. Then, as q is also Byzantine, D ≤ 2, which is impossible as D ≥ Z ≥ 3.
So p is necessarily correct, and P0 is true if we take p0 = p and S0 = S. If Z = 3, ignore the
following step.
• Let us suppose that Pi is true, with i < card(S). As card(Si) = card(S)−i ≥ 1, pi necessarily
received (m′, Si+1) from a node pi+1 located at i+3 hops or less from q, with Si = Si+1∪{pi+1}
and pi+1 /∈ Si+1. Thus, we have card(Si+1) = card(Si)− 1 = card(S)− i− 1. Let us suppose
that pi+1 is Byzantine. Then, as q is also Byzantine, D ≤ i + 3 ≤ card(S) + 2 < Z, which is
impossible as D ≥ Z. So pi+1 is necessarily correct, and Pi+1 is true.
Therefore, Pcard(S) is true, and pcard(S) sent (m′, ø), as card(Scard(S)) = card(S) − card(S) = 0.
According to the protocol, it implies that pcard(S) delivered m
′ before u, which contradicts our
initial hypothesis. Hence, the result.
Lemma 9. Let us suppose that D ≥ Z. Let (u1, . . . , un) be a path of distinct correct nodes, with
3 ≤ n ≤ Z, such that u1 and un deliver m0. Then, at least one of the nodes u2 and un−1 delivers
m0.
Proof. As u1 and un deliver m0, and therefore multicast (m0, ø), let E1 and E2 be the two following
events: (E1) u2 receives (m0, ø) from u1 and (E2) un−1 receives (m0, ø) from un. Let us suppose
that E2 is the first event to occur. As un delivers m0, according to the protocol, un stops. Therefore,
for the node un−1, Rec(un) = (m0, ø) until the end of the execution.
Let us prove the following property Pi by induction, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 2: ui multicasts (m0, Si), with
Si ⊆ {u1, . . . , un−2} and card(Si) ≤ i− 1.
• As u1 delivers m0, u1 multicasts (m0, ø). Therefore, P1 is true if we take S0 = ø
• Let us suppose that Pi is true, for i < n − 2. Then, ui+1 receives (m0, Si) from ui, with
card(Si) ≤ i− 1 < n− 3 ≤ Z − 3. When it does, two possibilities:
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– If ui+1 has stopped, ui+1 has necessarily delivered an information. As D ≥ Z, according
to Lemma 8, this information was m0. Thus, according to the protocol, ui+1 has already
multicast (m0, ø), and Pi+1 is true if we take Si+1 = ø.
– Otherwise, as card(Si) ≤ Z− 3, ui+1 multicasts (m0, Si ∪{ui}). Thus, Pi+1 is true if we
take Si+1 = Si ∪ {ui}.
Therefore, Pn−2 is true, and un−1 receives (m0, Sn−2) from un−2, with Sn−2 ⊆ {u1, . . . , un−2} and
card(Sn−2) ≤ n − 3 ≤ Z − 3. Thus, for the node un−1, Rec(un−2) = (m0, Sn−2), with un /∈ Sn−2.
Thus, as we already have Rec(un) = (m0, ø), according to the protocol, un−1 delivers m0.
If E1 is the first event to occur, by a perfectly symmetric reasoning, we show that u2 delivers m0.
Hence, the result.
Lemma 10. Let us suppose that D ≥ Z. Let P be a correct polygon, and let p1 and p2 be two
neighbor nodes of P that deliver m0. Then, all the nodes of P deliver m0.
Proof. Let z ≤ Z be the number of nodes of P . Let us prove the following property Pi by induction,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ z − 1: there exists a path of i + 1 nodes of P that deliver m0.
• P1 is true, as (p1, p2) is a path of 2 nodes that deliver m0.
• Let us suppose that Pi is true for i < z − 1. Let (u1, . . . , ui+1) be a path of i + 1 nodes that
deliver m0. Let {q1, . . . , qn} be n nodes such that (u1, . . . , ui+1, q1, . . . , qn, u1) is a circular
path on P . Then, (ui+1, q1, . . . , qn, u1) is a path of correct nodes where ui+1 and u1 deliver
m0. Therefore, according to Lemma 9, at least one of the nodes q1 and qn deliver m0. Thus,
at least one of the paths (qn, u1, . . . , ui+1) and (u1, . . . , ui+1, q1) contains i+2 nodes of P that
deliver m0, and Pi+1 is true.
Therefore, Pz−1 is true, and the z nodes of P deliver m0.
Theorem 1. If D > Z, we achieve reliable broadcast.
Proof. Let s be the source and let p be a correct node. According to Lemma 3, s belongs to a
correct polygon P and p belongs to a correct polygon P ′. According to Lemma 7, there exists a
correct polygonal path (Q1, . . . , Qn) such that Q1 = P and Qn = P
′.
Let us prove the following property Pi by induction, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n: all the nodes of Qi deliver m0.
• First, let us show that P1 is true. Let q be a neighbor of s on Q1. As Q1 is correct, according
to the protocol, q delivers m0. Then, according to Lemma 10, P1 is true.
• Let us suppose that Pi is true, for i < n. Let u1 and u2 be the two nodes shared by Qi and
Qi+1. As Pi is true, u1 and u2 deliver m0. Then, according to Lemma 10, Pi+1 is true.
Thus, Pn is true, and p delivers m0. Hence, the result.
3.3 Bounds tightness
Let us show that the bound on D (Theorem 1) cannot be improved.
Theorem 2. If D ≥ Z, no algorithm can guarantee reliable broadcast on 4-connected planar graphs.
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Proof. Let us suppose the opposite: there exists an algorithm guaranteeing reliable broadcast on
4-connected planar graphs for D ≥ Z. Let us consider the network of Figure 2.
Figure 2: Critical case for D ≥ Z
In this network, D = Z = 4, thus D ≥ Z is satisfied. Here, we have 4 nodes (2 correct, 2 Byzantine)
forming a node-cut that isolates the grey part of the network, which contains the source.
As there is a perfect symmetry between the 2 correct nodes and the 2 Byzantine nodes, the outer
nodes can never determine m0 with certitude, and reliable broadcast is impossible. This contradic-
tion achieves the proof.
Nevertheless, notice that it does not make the condition D > Z necessary for all graphs: the
necessary and sufficient condition to achieve byzantine resilient broadcast may be more complex
than the distance between Byzantine failures. We leave this as an open question.
4 Time complexity
In this section, we assume that the delay between two activations of the same process has an
upper bound T . Then, we show that reliable broadcast is achieved in O(d) time units, d being
the diameter of the network. This is the same time complexity as a simple broadcast, where any
information received is retransmitted without verification.
Lemma 11. Let p be a node located a L ≥ 1 hops from the source. Then, there exists a correct
polygonal path of at most Y 3ZL polygons connecting p to the source.
Proof. Let P be a correct polygon containing the source s, and let P ′ be a correct polygon containing
p. Such polygons exist, according to Lemma 3. Let (u1, . . . , uL+1) be a path connecting s and p,
and let Ui be the set of polygons containing ui. Each set Ui is connected, otherwise {ui} would
be a node-cut. Therefore, U = U1 ∪ · · · ∪ UL+1 is connected. As each set Ui contains at most Y
polygons, U contains at most Y (L + 1) polygons.
Therefore, there exists a polygonal path (P1, . . . , Pn) of at most Y(L+1) polygons, with P1 = P
and Pn = P
′. If this path is correct, the result is trivial. Otherwise, let (PN , . . . , PM ) be a sequence
of Byzantine nodes, as defined in Lemma 7.
Let us consider the proof of Lemma 5. The circular path (q1, . . . , qm) contains at most Y Z nodes,
and each set Si contains at most Y polygons. Thus, the set S = S1 ∪ · · · ∪ Sm contains at most
Y 2Z polygons.
Therefore, according to the proof of Lemma 7, (PN , . . . , PM ) can be replaced by a sequence of
at most Y 2Z polygons. As the number of Byzantine sequences in (P1, . . . , Pn) is strictly inferior
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to n/2, the correct path thus obtained contains at most Y 2Zn/2 ≤ Y 2ZY (L + 1)/2 ≤ Y 3ZL
polygons.
Theorem 3. Reliable broadcast is achieved in O(d) time units.
Proof. Let us suppose that the source broadcasts m0 at a date t0.
Let Q be a correct polygon, and let us suppose that two nodes of Q have delivered m0 at a date t.
Then, according to the proof of Lemma 10, a third node delivers m0 before t + ZT , and so forth.
Thus, all nodes of Q deliver m0 before t+Z
2T . Similarly, all nodes of P deliver m0 before t0+Z
2T .
According to Lemma 11, for any node p located at L ≥ 1 hops from the source, there exists a
correct polygonal path of Y 3ZL polygons connecting this node to the source. Thus, according to
the proof of Theorem 1, p delivers m0 before t0 + Y
3Z3LT .
Therefore, as L ≤ d, reliable broadcast is achieved in Y 3Z3Td time units. Thus, as Y , Z and T
are bounded, reliable broadcast is achieved in a O(d) time.
5 Required memory
In this section, we show that our solution is the first Byzantine resilient broadcast in sparse multi-
hop networks where the used memory increases linearly with the size of informations, and not
exponentially.
Indeed, the existing solutions [10, 2, 21, 16, 17, 18], the nodes are supposed to store as many
information messages m as necessary. However, the Byzantine nodes can potentially broadcast all
possible false informations m′ 6= m0. This strategy is referred to as exhaustion in the literature
[24, 25]. Therefore, the correct nodes implicitly require O(2M ) bits of memory to ensure reliable
broadcast, M being the maximal number of bits of an information m.
In our protocol, we made the following modification : instead of storing all the messages received,
we only store the last message received from a neighbor q in the variable Rec(q). Thus, the nodes
only require O(M) bits of memory. More precisely, let us consider a finite network, and let X be
the maximal number of bits of a node identifier. As the largest tuple (m,S) that a correct node can
accept verifies card(S) ≤ Z, each variable Rec requires at most M + ZX bits. Thus, each correct
node requires at most Y (M + ZX) bits of memory.
Concerning the memory required in channels, the problem is the same for all solutions: we must
assume that the delay between two activations of a same process belongs to an interval [T1, T2],
T1 > 0 – otherwise, the memory is impossible to bound. Indeed, let N be the smallest integer
such that N > T2/T1. Then, as a node receives all the messages of its channels when activated,
a channel connecting two correct nodes contains at most N tuples (m,S). Besides, if a channel is
connected to a Byzantine node, it can be overflowed without consequences: it is unimportant that
a Byzantine node receives messages, and the messages received from a Byzantine node are already
unpredictable. Thus, each channel requires at most N(M + XZ) bits of memory.
Therefore, the local memory required in now O(M) instead of O(2M ).
6 Conclusion
We generalized the condition on the distance between Byzantine nodes to a class of planar graphs,
and shown its tightness. Our solution has the same time complexity as a basic broadcast, and
requires less memory than the previous solutions.
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An open problem is to find more involved criteria for the placement of Byzantine failures, and to
extend it to more general graphs. Also, even if we already have a linear time complexity, some
optimizations could be made to further reduce the time to deliver genuine information.
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